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Energy conservation and investment behaviour: 
An empirical analysis of influential factors and attitudes 
1. Introduction 
Energy conservation as part of an integrated environmental plan has had much attention, in The 
Netherlands and elsewhere in the world. Two main reasons explain this interest. The first reason it 
that it has become clear that the emissions of C02 must be reduced and eventually stabilized. The 
goals set by the Dutch government require a stabilization of the emission level of the level of 1989 
(Dutch National Environmental policy plan (1990), Nota Energiebesparing (1990), Vervolgnota 
Energiebesparing (1993)). Energy conservation is regarded as one of the main means of reducing 
COz emissions, and it has been shown that the cost of reducing energy demand by the 
hnplementation of more energy efficiënt technologies is reasonably low: given the state of 
technology and current energy prices a reduction in energy consumption of over 20% can be 
realized at negative costs (Blok et al. (1990, 1992); SEO (1991); Van der Werff and Opschoor 
(1992)). 
The second reason why energy conservation is of interest (to especially economists) is that a great 
part of the economically profitable energy conservation technologies is not implemented by industry 
(Van der Werff and Opschoor 1992). The general theoretical thought is that firms are somehow 
hampered in implementing energy efficiënt technologies. Market barriers are named as an 
explanation why firm do not implement all economically attractive technologies. Other reasons 
include: a small incentive for investing in energy conservation technologies, bounded rationality and 
paradigm theory. 
An empirical analysis of barriers for the adoption of energy conservation technologies at the firm 
level has not often been performed. In this paper we try to investigate empirically the relations 
between firm specific variables and the energy conservation investment decision, in order to make a 
preliminary ranking in the importance of some decision and control variables on the actual observed 
investment decision. Consequently, the empirically established relations can be checked against the 
existing list of theoretical barriers. Our paper explores the influences of some variables on the 
energy conservation investment decision, rather than explaining the decision process by a general 
model. We use data that were collected during a survey on energy conservation investment 
behaviour in the Netherlands in 1993. 
In section 2 we briefly sketch an investment framework and give a list of potentially important 
variables and barriers, which are often mentioned in literature. The survey will be discussed in 
section 3, as well as the defïnition of investment behaviour. We will also describe the method of 
analysis. In section 4 the empirical influences of variables on the observed mvestment decision are 
analyzed. The result of the analysis will be a clustering of potentially important variables into 
important and unimportant variables. Section 5 analyses statements and attitudes about the import-
ance of variables in future investment decisions. The result here will also be a clustering of 
variables according to their empirical importance^ Section 6 combines the results of sections 4 and 
5, and draws conclusions from the combjned result. Knowing which factors can be demonstrated to 
be important is a necessary step before one can actually start building a comprehensible model. 
\ 
2. A sketch on investment decisions arid barriers to energy conservation 
In a textbook world, where there is no uncertainty about future states of events and cashflows, all 
information is freely available at no costs and there is a unlimited access to capital market, the 
investment decision of a profit (or utility) maximizing firm would imply investing in all available 
investment alteraatives that have a positive net present value (cf. Bierman and Smidt 1993; Brealey 
and Myers, 1991). In this situation the (certain) cashflows and hence profitability of an energy 
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conservation technology is determined by energy prices alone.1 
Introducing uncertainty and interdependence between alternatives result in the first reasons why 
firms do not invest in seemingly profitable technologies: 1) the risks attached to investment are too 
high; and 2) the impact on other technologies are negative that they offset the possible gains. The 
obvious variable determining energy conservation gains is the energy price. Expectations regarding 
future energy prices and expected fluctuations in future energy prices are the main economie source 
of uncertainty connected with energy conservation investments. In other words: high fluctuation in 
energy prices can be seen as a barrier to adoption of energy efficiënt technologies. Low energy 
prices lead to low expected net present values of an investment. Consequently, lower expected 
energy prices can be a barrier to the adoption of energy efficiënt technologies. 
There are two ways of incorporating risk into the investment decision. The first way is to make risk 
explicit by introducing a probability density function of expected return. This is a very complex 
(but theoretically proper) way of assessing risk. The second way is more commonly used by firms: 
risk is implicitly assessed by requiring that the investment still is profitable after sorne adjustments 
for risk. The easiest way of adjusting is to invest only in projects with high returns on investment. 
In practice it means that firms require high internal rates of return, or more commonly used: a 
shorter pay back period. Firms that are (extremely) risk averse have short pay back periods. 
Theoretically this would imply a lower degree of implementation. 
Many firms use a uniform criterion for evaluating investments. For many firms this would be a 
uniform hurdle rate for pay back periods. Some firms, however, appear to use a different hurdle rate 
for energy conservation technologies. A higher hurdle rate indicates that these firms attach higher 
risk to the energy conservation technologies. By the same argument mentioned above, one would 
expect that these firms have implemented less in energy conservation technologies. The opposite 
could be true for firms who use lower hurdle rates for energy conservation technologies. 
Energy prices determine the profitability of an energy efficiënt technology in a sense that higher 
prices mean higher gains. But the energy conservation gains are also determined by the actual 
amount of energy saved. Apparently firms with a larger energy bill can save more energy in 
absolute terms than firms with a small energy bill (ceteris paribus). Theoretically this would imply 
that firms with a higher energy bill have more incentive to invest and therefore have a higher 
degree of implementating energy conservation technologies. 
The framework of profit (or utility) maximizing firms cannot explain the energy conservation 
investment behaviour adequately. Simon (1955, 1959) suggests a framework of satisfyeing profit (or 
utility). His framework of rationality is one "...that is compatible with the access to infonnation and 
the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds 
of environments in which such organisms exist (Simon 1955)". It is often referred to as "bounded 
rationality". Information in real situation can be costly and the costs of collecting all necessary 
infonnation can offset the potential gains. Simon' s observation that infonnation is costly leads him 
to specify his "satisficing principle". Once a certain profit (or utility) is reached, the firm does not 
look for further investment projects, because the gains are too small compared to the effort and 
costs of infonnation collection. This is especially true when the expected gains (in terms of money 
saved) are small. This holds for smaller firms. Large firms can profit from "economies of scale". 
Moreover, the costs of collecting information will be lower, due to a higher number of infonnation 
1
 Implicitly we assume that investment costs and technological efficiency are fixed. 
Expectations about future energy prices play no role because every state of events is known in 
advance. As a consequence of all these assumptions, firms have the same expected rate of return as 
well. 
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lines. Size of a firm, therefore, can serve as a proxy for economies of scale effects, and is expected 
to have a positive influence on energy conservation decision. 
The second part of a bounded rationality framework is a bounded search strategy due to 
technologically induced factors. Dosi (1988) argues that fïrms are "locked in" in a certain 
technological paradigm, where they are not "open minded" about innovative technologies in another 
paradigm. This can explain the phenomenon of the "distance to core business" argument. Firms 
mention the fact that energy conservation is not their core business activity and neglect to (or are 
not able to) fully analyze the potential gains of energy conservation, resulting in a low diffusion of 
technologies (see also Schot 1991). 
Other theories, especially theories of firm (cf. Jensen and Meckling 1976; Williamson 1974), 
emphasize the importance of the organization and the position of management on the energy 
conservation investment behaviour. Principal-agent theories (landlord-tenant problems) are used to 
explain the role of management as a barrier to the adoption of energy conservation investments. 
DeCanio (1993) states that "managers will be deterred from initiating risky projects if the personal 
consequences of failure seem to be much higher than the payoff to success". Sassone and Martucci 
(1984) have shown that management of a firm is likely to underestimate the possible gains from 
cost-cutting technologies by 10% while they overestimate the gains of market opportunities with 
40%. Cost-reducing investment are not properly valued, leading to an under investment in (among 
others) energy conservation technologies. 
Also the costs of initiating or replacing old equipment can be an explanation of why the diffusion 
process of economically attractive options is going slow. In many cases a more efficiënt technology 
is already available, but fïrms will not replace their old equipment because it is not yet fully 
depreciated. Firms who do replace their old technology with a more efficiënt technology are 
expected to have a higher degree of implementation. 
In connection with costs of initiating or replacing, the firm's fmancial situation and market 
expectations might play an important role. Replacement of technologies often requires the 
possibility of investing in a new technology. However, the situation could occur where replacement 
is profitable, but the firm is not capable to raise the money for the initial capital outlay, or that 
capital is more urgently needed in another part of the firm. Theoretically one would expect that 
poor market expectations and fmancial situation lead to postponement of replacement, and 
consequently to a lower degree of implementation. Market imperfections, such as limited access to 
capital market, lending at an interest rate which is higher than the normal interest rate may re-
enforce the difficulties of raising capital. The expectation is that more possible types of fmancial 
sources would increase investments. Also the nature of the fmancial sources might play a role. 
Financing investments with own money might be more expensive, but is often easier than 
borrowing from the bank. 
So far we have discussed some variables that are expected to have an influence on the energy 
conservation investment behaviour. Some of them were expected to have a positive influence, such 
as size, energy bill, high expected energy prices and low hurdle rates for energy conservation 
investments. Others were expected to have a negative influence on the investment decision, and 
might serve as potential barriers for the diffusion of energy conservation technologies. Among this 
group of variables are: low expected energy prices, large expected fluctuation in energy prices, 
market failures (limited access to capital market), high initial costs of information collection, non-
core business activities and lack of openness to innovation. Below, we will empirically investigate 
the influence of all these variables on investment behaviour. However, first we will present the 
definition of investment behaviour which we have not yet given so far, and discuss the survey. 
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3. Survey, definitions and sectoral results 
To analyze the importance of the variables on the energy conservation investment decision a survey 
was held in 1993, questioning 313 Dutch firms about their state of the art unplementation and 
profitability of energy efficiënt technologies. The survey consists of two parts. The first part 
inventories the state of the art knowledge and unplementation of technologies at the firm level. The 
second part consists of the registration of firm specific variables and attitudes that can, in some 
way, serve as an explanation for the observed state of the art unplementation. Observed differences 
in investment behaviour can then be understood in terms of different firm specific characteristics, of 
which some can pose an effective barrier to the adoption of energy efficiënt technologies. 
3.1 State of the art knowledge, implementation and profitability 
Because the possibilities of energy efficiency improvement differ much across sectors, firms were 
questioned about technologies that are applicable to the sector in which they are economically 
active. The degree of disaggregation is a 2-digit sectoral code. This resulted in a selection of 41 
sectors, see appendix A. The energy producing sector and the household sector are not considered 
in this paper. The data on conservation technologies in the 41 different (sub)sectors were taken 
from the database ICARUS (Blok et al. 1992). For each technology that can be implemented before 
the year 2000, ICARUS provides information on technical aspects (such as potential savings, 
lifetime, main fuel carrier) and some economie aspects (such as initial investment costs and 
operation and maintenance costs). With these data it is possible to calculate the technical and econ-
omie potential for energy savings in the year 2000 (see Blok et al. 1992). 
In our survey each firm i was provided with a list of six technologically possible energy conserva-
tion technologies (Tü..Ti6) and was asked which of those technologies: 
- were known; 
- were implemented; 
- were considered profitable. 
The following coding scheme was adopted: 
y 1 1' if firm i knows option j 
Av = [0, else 
r _"J 1> if firm i implements option j 
v ~ [0, else 
' _ j 1» if firm i finds option j profitable 
'V \ 0, else 
From ICARUS the potential energy savings expressed as the percentage of reduced energy 
consumption were taken. Let the set of potential energy savings for each firm be coded as Pn-JV 
For notational convenience we do not explicitly refer to each individual technology. By construction 
of the database, Pn..Pi6 refer to the potential savings for the six corresponding technologies that a 
respondent was confronted with. Having only 313 respondents in 41 (sub)sectors, statistical analysis 
is very difficult; therefore the respondents were grouped in 11 aggregated sector, see appendix A. 
With these coding schemes we can explore the state of the art knowledge, the implementation of 
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energy efficiënt technologies and the stated profitability of technologies by firms. The state of the 
art knowledge is the ratio of weighed known technologies over the maximum possible energy 
conservation technologies: 
EV*» 
K. = ^ *100% 
1
 6 
E'* 
;=i 
The state of the art implementation is defined by: 
6 
E P.*Y.. ij ij 
I. = Jd *100% 
EV*. 
y-i 
Here it is implicitly assumed that a firm can only implement a technology when it is known. 
Similarly, the state of the art profitability is defined by: 
6 
£~Ê ij ij 
R, = & *100% 
1
 6 
E p..*x.. v v J-i-
However, a misleading image can be created. The data show that there are many respondents who 
implement a certain technology although they claim it is not profitable. The opposite is also true: 
Some technologies are considered profitable, but are nevertheless not implemented. Implementation 
in the above defïnition includes both profitable and non-profitable technologies (I, is independent of 
the Zj/s). Profitable technologies can be implemented or not. We call profitable technologies that 
not (yet) have been implemented the unexploited potential, and we call the technologies that have 
been implemented but were not considered profitable non-profitable implement at ions. Table 1 
provides insights into the division of implemented and profitable technologies. 
Sector total 
knowledge 
(1) 
total 
implemented 
(2) 
non-profit 
implemented 
(3) 
profitable 
implemented 
(4) 
unexploited 
potential 
(5) 
total 
profitable 
(6) 
Agriculture 68.0 42.5 9.2 33.3 5.7 44.3 
food, drinks 58.1 65.2 14.4 50.8 5.9 54.6 
meat 70.3 65.1 6.3 58.8 14.2 78.3 
bulk 
chemicals 
45.3 39.5 10.8 28.6 24.3 46.2 
other 
chemical 
56.7 55.1 16.6 39.5 0.0 39.5 
building 53.9 76.3 16.2 60.1 1.0 65.5 
metal 29.5 76.8 14.4 62.3 5.5 68.8 
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other 
industry 
67.8 61.3 19.9 41.4 11.0 49.8 
banks & 
insurance 
82.9 66.2 9.84 56.4 9.8 65.6 
retail 88.3 60.5 9.2 51.4 14.1 63.6 
health & 
education 
85.9 72.0 17.8 5.4 7.9 62.7 
total sample 66.4 60.8 13.1 47.8 8.4 56.5 
Tahle 1: Summ tary results of implementation and profitability. 
Thus, in column (1) knowledge is presented as the percentage of maximum technologically 
attainable energy efficiency; column (2) indicates the percentage of known technologies that is 
implemented (be it profitable or not); in column (3) the percentage of non-profitable energy 
conservation implementation is listed, whereas in (4) the profitable investments are listed. In theory, 
(2) should equal (3)+(4), because by definition the total implementation exists of profitable and 
non-profitable implementations. Column (5) shows the unexploited potential, which is defined as 
the percentage of known technologies that are considered profitable but not implemented for some 
reason. Column (4) and (5) list all the profitable technologies (implemented and not-implemented, 
respectively); therefore by definition column (6) should equal (4)+(5). In practice, this is not always 
the case, because these results are aggregates at a sectoral level. Differences imply that the 
respondents in this sector differ largely in implementation and profitability. 
We find that there is a big difference in knowledge between sectors. Some sectors know very little 
about the technical possibilities of energy conservation (such as the the metal sector and the bulk 
chemical sector), while some sectors know almost all energy conservation technologies (such as the 
health and education sector and the retail sector). One possible explanation may be that the 
technologies in the metal industry and chemical industry are more complicated than in, for instance, 
the retail sector. A reason why the health and education sector know many technologies might be 
the close connections with the (local) government. 
Total implementation of known technologies varies from about 40% bulk chemicals to almost 80% 
in the building and metal industry. Also the unexploited potential varies very much over sectors, 
while the share of non-profitable implementations is rather constant (about 17% of total 
implementation). From table 1 one can see that an important role is played by column (4). This is 
the percentage of known energy conservation technologies that are implemented and considered 
profitable by the firm. From a rational investment decision framework, this variable is the most 
important variable to be explained. Moreover, it appears that the profitable implementations rnake 
up 82% of all implementations. Thus, the investment behaviour is now defined as: 
6 
E?..*F..*Z.. V V V 
I. = tl *100% 
7-1 
Note that investment behaviour is still defined as the ratio of weighted profitable implementation 
over weighted knowledge. All triree main variables (knowledge, implementation and profitability) 
are included in this definition. The advantages of this definition are: 1) degree of implementation is 
weighed according to the potential savings of the implemented technologies; 2) because it is a 
scaled variable, results can be compared between sectors, even though these sectors might differ 
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greatly. One disadvantage of this definition is that the investment behaviour is expressed as a 
percentage of known technologies. If, for example, a firms knows only one relevant technologies 
and has also implemented this technology, the degree of implementation is 100%, whereas a firm 
that knows all relevant technologies but implements only a few has a lower degree of imple-
mentation. In other words, this definition does not take into account the existence of a knowledge 
gap, the difference between what is technologically possible and what is known by the firms. 
Although getting insights into the determinants of the knowledge gap is very important, we will not 
address this question here because we would like to focus on the determinants of implementation of 
profitable energy conservation technologies. 
3.2 Firm specific variables in the survey 
In the second part of the survey the respondents were asked to answer questions in two categories. 
The first category contained questions to empirically test the hypothesized influences of firm 
specific variables on investment behaviour. The second category contains questions about the 
importance of certain variables in future energy conservation investment decision. From the 
questions the important variables can be stylized. For the first category, the variables can be 
grouped as follows (see appendix B for more details): 
Economie variables Energy related variables Knowledge variables Management 
Variables 
1. Size of the firm 1. Gas bill 1. Number of 1. Organizational 
2. Hurdle rate 2. Electricity bill information sources structure (type) 
3. Different hurdle rates 3. Energy intensity 2. Energy coördinator 2. Position of energy 
for energy conservation 4. Expected energy 3. R & D department management 
4. Market expectations prices (1994 and 2000) 3.Energy conservation 
5. Number and nature of 5. Fluctuation in energy as innovation reason 
financial sources1 prices 4. Priorities to cost-
6. Degree of competition 6. Relative energy cutting 
7. Budgetary constraints efficiency 5. Premature 
depreciation 
1. Own versus borrowed money 
Table 2: list of potentially influential variables 
All these variables can be empirically measured, either directly (such as size and energy bill) or 
indirectly (expected fluctuations in energy prices); continuous (e.g. energy intensity) or discrete 
(energy coördinator Yes/No). This provides us with the possibility to analyze the relations between 
a certain variable and the observed investment behaviour. 
The second category of variables deals with potential barriers. It is, however, more difficult to 
directly analyze the relation between investment behaviour and variables from this category. The 
respondents were asked to state the importance of certain variables when a (future) energy 
conservation investment decision is made. For instance, if a firm states that having own financial 
sources is very important, does that mean that the firm finds this item important because it has 
plenty of financial sources or that it lacks the capabilities of generating own financial sources. In 
other words: is there a direct causal relation between stated importance and observed investment 
behaviour? 
One possible way to answer this is to find a corresponding variable in the first category of variables 
and to analyze the relation between stated importance and observed actions. In the case of financial 
sources, we can 1) analyze the relation between investment behaviour and number & nature of 
financial sources; and 2) analyze the relation between number & nature of sources and the stated 
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importance of having own financial sources. This procedure requires that there is a certain 
correspondence between variables in category 1 and 2. Unfortunately, this is not always possible 
due to some problems of quantifying variables in the second category. Below a list is given of 
stated importance (category 2) and their quantifyable equivalents. For each of the listed possible 
barriers the following coding scheme has been adopted (see table 3): 
Ba 
0.9, when considered very important 
0.8, when considered important 
0.5, when considered impartial 
0.2, when considered unimportant 
0.1, when considered totally unimportant 
where Bik is the importance of barrier kto firm /', (k=l,..,23; i=l,..,313). 
Possible barrier (category 1) Quantitative equivalent (category 2) 
1. contribution to total profits 1. potential* energy bill 
2. return on investment 2. P B P ^ hurdle rate 
3. distance to core business 3a. P B P ^ - P B P ^ 
3b. energy conservation as reason for innovations 
4. size of energy bill 4. gas bill/ electricity bill (*1000 Dutch Gld) 
5. uncertainty with new technologies 5a. number of information sources 
5b. development new technologies 
6. own financial sources 6. reserves, earmarked budget 
7. external financial sources 7. bank, LT-capital 
8. uncertainty about future energy prices 8. spread between maximum and minimum 
expected energy prices (1994 and 2000; 1993=100) 
9. low expected energy prices 9. minimum expected energy prices (1994 and 
2000; 1993=100) 
10. internal rules 10. type of organization (increases with 
complexity) 
11. external rules 11. Sectoral long term agreement; external pressure 
12. internal opposition 12. size; type of organization 
13. market expectations 13. expectations index (1993=100) 
14. degree of competition 14. possibility of calculating production cost 
increase in sales prices 
IS. required additional investment costs 15. budgetary problems 
16. additional effort of implementation 16. average effort trom ICARUS 
17. additional effort for information collection 17a.number of information sources 
17b.energy coördinator 
18. qualified personnel 18. organizational complexity/external energy 
coördinator 
19. high standards of production quality 19. motive innovation: product innovation 
20. high standards of production flexibility 20. motive innovation: production flexibility 
21. high standards of working conditions 21a motive innovation: increase labour productivity 
21b motive innovation: reduction of labour costs 
22. old equipment not yet fully depreciated 22. Premature depreciation allowance 
23. environmental image 23. Environmental care system/ Int energy coord. 
' "able 3: list of possible barriers and their quantita tive equivalent 
The idea behind this table is that there must be some consistent correspondence between the 
importance of barriers (on the left hand side) and the observed firm specific variables (on the right 
hand side). For example, a firm that states that uncertainty about fluctuating energy prices plays an 
important role in initiating energy conservation investments should, in our opinion, also state that it 
expects high fluctuations in future energy prices. If not, then the whole idea of testing barriers 
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would feil. The empirical results of this correspondence test are presented in section 5.2. 
3.3 Method of analysis 
Because this is a preliminary analysis for finding relations, the simple techniques of partial 
correlation and OLS-regression are used. These techniques check for linear relationships between 
two variables. The assumption of linearity is made for reasons of simplicity. When OLS is used for 
a limited dependent variable, as in this case, the results may sometimes not be very accurate, 
because OLS can "push" the estimated variable over the natural limits, hence losing its 
interpretation. The normal way of dealing with this problem is to transform the limited dependent 
into an unlimited variables using the logistic transformation ln(y/(l-y)). However, this 
transformations does not work well in our case because there are many data points on the boundary 
(e.g. many zero implementations and 100% implementations, see figure 1. 
Figure 1: Distribution of implementation of firms 
Logistic transformation breaks down at those data points. Therefore the decision was made not to 
transform these data, but to choose a slightly different approach. The approach taken is the 
following: first the whole data set is analyzed. Next the data set is divided into two parts: partial 
adopters (implementation between 0% and 100%), which we will refer to as group A; and full and 
non-adopters (implementation either 0% or 100%), which we will refer to as group B. In this group 
the two extremes are represented. If barriers exist, they should be most apparent in this group. OLS 
is used for the first group (with the possibility of transformation, since all the difficult data points 
are in the second part) and logistic regression for the second part. The results are then compared to 
see whether this approach is better than the result fïom the analysis of the entire sample. For each 
variable, we will argue what the influence is expected to be (positive/negative) Before performing 
the analyses, partial plots were made to get a quick picture of the empirical relation. These pictures 
are not included in this paper because the scatter plot are highly non-informative. This is an 
indication that some relations are less clear cut than theory suggests. 
Table 3 links the observed firm specific variables to the stated importance of the potential barriers. 
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Comparing table 2 and the right side of table 3, one can see that all fïrm specific variables in table 
2 can be found somewhere in table 3, which implies a coverage from observed firm specific 
variables to potential barriers. The other way around is less covered in our opinion, because the 
barriers are described in a more qualitative marmer. 
We proceed as follows: in the next section we discuss the results from the analysis of firm specific 
factors on investment behaviour. In section 5 we will analyze the relations as suggested in table 3 
and also analyze the relations between the potential barriers and the observed degree of 
implementation. Section 6 will summarize the findings of sections 4 and 5 and present conclusions 
and recommendations for further research. 
4. Empirical relations of determinants of investment behaviour 
In this section we present the results of our experiences in finding relations between the observed 
variables (as listed in table 2) and the investment behaviour of firms. As mentioned above, we 
define investment behavior as the percentage of known energy conservation technologies that are 
implemented and considered profitable. This variable has its range from 0 to 100%. As our sample 
we use all respondents that have filled in information regarding a specific variable. The maximum 
sample space is 313 respondents. It is our goal to analyze which firm specific variables are suited to 
explain investment behavior. We present our empirical results in categories, corresponding with 
table 2. 
4.1. Economie variables 
Table 4 presents the results from the analysis of the influences of economie variables on investment 
decision. For each variable the expected and empirical signs are listed, as well as the significance of 
the influence. 
Name of 
variable 
Expected 
influence on EC-
investments 
Empirical 
influence 
in group A 
Significance 
of influence in 
group A* 
Empirical 
influence in 
group B 
Significance of 
influence in 
group B 
ln(size) in Dlf 
(•1000) 
positive positive significant positive insignificant 
PBP Cut-off 
points (in 
years) 
positive negative insignificant positive insignificant 
lower hurdle 
rates for 
energy 
conservation 
positive positive insignificant positive significant by 
comparing 
group means 
Market 
expectations 
index 
positive positive significant positive insignificant 
number of 
financial 
sources 
positive negative insignificant positive insignificant 
Nature of 
financial 
sources 
dept=negative; 
equity=positive 
negative; 
positive 
significant indecisive insignificant 
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Market share negative no 
influence 
insignificant negative significant 
Possibility to 
include cost 
increase in 
sales price 
positive positive significant positive significant 
budgetary 
constraints 
negative positive significant positive insignificant 
Explanation of signiflcance: significant: t-value > 1.5; semi-significant: 1.5 > t-value > 1; insignificant: t-value 
< 1. 
Table 4: Results from empirical analysis 
As can be seen from table 4, most of the variables have the expected influence. Size proves to be a 
good indication for economies of scale. In other words, small firms have less opportunities to invest 
in energy conservation technologies than large firms. Hence, we expect that the diffusion process 
for small firms is longer. 
Also the variable market expectations has the exdected sign. Firms with better market expectations 
, . , o ., . ., j ., Market e x p e c t a t i o n for 1994 
show to be rurther m the adoption process than
 lnoex 1M3,100 
firms with poor market expectations. One 
explanation might be that good market 
expectations can lead to expansion of the 
capital stock in the most energy efficiënt way. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of market 
expectations. Firms are modest in their 
expectations, which can lead to a slow 
adoption of energy conservation technologies 
in the near future. Bad financial situation and 
poor market expectations can be seen as an 
economie barrier for the adoption of energy 
conservation technologies. 
Lililllllliiii. 
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Figure 2 Distribution of market expectations 
The nature of sources to finance investments seems to play an important role: firms who borrow 
money from the bank have implemented less than firms that were in a position to finance the 
mvestment out of own resources. Apparently the bank wants security and places strong 
requirements when firms try to obtain a loan. The fact that some firms are able to finance the 
investment without the help of an intermediary can also mean that their financial position is better 
than firms who need to go to a bank. Firms that rely on governmental subsidies for financing 
energy conservation technologies depend also on an "intermediary", and consequently also have a 
lower degree of implementation. The conclusion that can be drawn is that using an "intermediary" 
seems to hamper energy conservation investments, and is therefore a barrier to the adoption of 
energy efficiënt technologies. 
There does not seem to be a direct relation between the degree of implementation and the maximum 
acceptable pay back period. One would have expected that this relation should be quite clear: lower 
hurdle rates lead to a higher degree of implementation. However, the implementation of profitable 
technologies does not only depend on the required minimum return on investment as posed by the 
firm, but also on the profitability of the technologies. In other words, one should take into account 
the cost-effectiveness structure of the energy conservation technologies, and analyze which 
technologies should have been implemented according to the minimum return on investment and the 
cost-effectiveness structure. Figure 3 shows the distribution of hurdle rates as stated by firms. The 
average hurdle rate is about 5 years. 
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Perhaps the most surprising result in table 4 is 
that firms who experienced budgetary 
problems seem to have a higher degree of 
implementation. The correlation between 
implementation and budgetary problems is 
quite high (rho=0.12). However, some 
inconsistent answers seem to have been given 
by the respondents. The correlation between 
implementation and using the bank as main 
source of funding investments is negative 
(which is in line with previous findings); the 
correlation between implementation and using 
reserves as main funding source is strongly 
positive (also in line with previous findings). Also the correlation between having budgetary 
problems and nature of financing investment is as expected: firms who fund with own money have 
less budgetary problems than firms who borrow from banks or depend on governmental subsidies. 
But previous findings suggest that the use of intermediaries hampers implementation, and this is in 
contrast with the fact that firms with budgetary problems (and thus often borrowing from banks) 
have a higher degree of implementation. The conclusion must be that the influence of budgetary 
constraints is vague. 
4.2. Energy related variables 
Table 5 presents the results from the empirical influences of energy related variables. 
Variable Expected 
influence 
Empirical 
influence in 
group A 
Significance Empirical 
influence in 
group B 
Significance 
Gas bill positive none insignificant none insignificant 
Electricity bill positive none insignificant none insignificant 
Small users 
dummy 
negative positive significant none insignificant 
Energy intensity positive positive significant negative insignificant 
Minimum 
expected energy 
prices 1994 
positive positive insignificant positive significant 
Minimum 
expected energy 
prices 2000 
positive negative insignificant negative significant 
Dummy for 
expected price 
increases 
positive positive significant positive significant 
Fluctuation in 
energy prices 1994 
negative negative insignificant negative significant 
Fluctuation in 
energy prices 2000 
negative positive significant positive significant 
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Relative energy 
efficiency 
positive positive insignificant positive significant 
Table 5: Results of empirical influences of energy related variables 
A look at table 5 will give the reader a strange feeling: The energy bill does not play a relevant role 
in the determination of energy conservation investments. The theoretical reasoning that a large 
energy bill gives more incentive to save energy and consequently attracts investments towards 
energy conservation in not supported by this survey. The only variable related to absolute energy 
use is a dummy for small energy users, and it is even positive. Energy intensity (energy costs 
related to total production costs) is significant in group A but not in group B. This ambigious result 
causes to raise questions about the reliability of the stated influence. 
Minimum expectations on 1994 energy prices show the expected positive correlation with 
implementation. Minimum energy prices secure the minimum profïtability; higher minimum prices 
lead to higher minimum profïtability. Minimum expected energy prices in 2000 have a counter 
intuitive sign. There we fïnd the opposite relationship, where high minimum energy prices have 
lower degree of implementation. The relation is not very strong, though. This could indicate that the 
year 200 is too far away for firms to include it into their analyses. 
Expected fluctuation is energy prices for 1994 tends to slow down the diffusion process, as higher 
fluctuations cause low implementations. Again the situation for the year 200 is not clear, probably 
due to a too far time horizon. 
4.3 Knowledge variables 
Variables in this group play "the odd-one out" role, because knowledge is already integrated in the 
definition of investment behaviour. Therefore, attention for this group should be modest, and we do 
not present a table with results, but rather discuss each of the variables shortly. 
The number of information sources positively affects the investment decision. One explanation 
could be that many different information sources mean that the firm is able to make an adequate 
cost benefit analysis and can make a better assessment of risks of investing or that the firm is 
exposed more intensively to information. There could, due to the definition, also be a negative 
influence of the number of information sources on investment decision, because more information 
will lead to more knowledge about energy conservation technologies. That in turn will increase the 
denominator of the definition and hence decrease the degree of implementation. Apparently, this 
effect is offset by a better assessment of benefits and risks. 
The presence of an internal energy coördinator does not influence the degree of implementation, at 
least not in a statistical way. Firms that do not employ an energy coördinator implement, on 
average, as much as firms who do employ an energy coördinator. This counter intuitive results must 
be viewed in the light of the survey sample. There are very few firms that have an internal energy 
coördinator. The additional revenues of employing an energy coördinator cannot statistically be 
proven. However, one would expect that the revenues to the firm of employing an energy 
coördinator will exceed the costs of yearly salary of an energy coördinator, and we must conclude 
that even though we cannot prove the additional revenues, we must assume that it must have its 
positive aspects. In a model, however, the variable "energy coördinator" is left out. Only large firms 
are in the position to employ an energy coördinator. The variable "Size", therefore, does not only 
incorporate economies of scale but also hidden effects, such as the presence of an energy 
coördinator. The same holds for an R&D department. 
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4.4 Management variables 
The role played by management (or the structure of the firm) concerning investment decisions 
cannot be underestimated. They have the power to cancel a highly profitable investment project for 
many reasons. In section 2 we have listed some arguments that provides explanations why managers 
sometimes act in their own favour, thereby neglecting the goal of maximizing shareholder value. In 
this paragraph we analyze 5 variables connected with the structure of the firm: the organizational 
complexity, the position of the energy manager, energy conservation as reason for investing in new 
technologies, the priority for either expansion or cost cutting projects, the possibility of premature 
depreciation. 
Organizational complexity is indicated by 3 dummy variables: simple complexity, moderately 
complexity, high complexity. We expect that although the complexity might bring incentives to 
managers to "cheat", the degree of implementation will be higher because of more specialized 
personnel. Thus, organizational complexity is not a proxy for "cheating possibilities", but rather a 
proxy for specialized personnel. This is supported by the survey where highly organized firms have 
invested more in energy conservation technologies2. The position of the energy manager does not 
seem to play a decisive role in the investment decision. It is also measured by 3 dummy variables 
indicating whether the (relative) position is high, middle or low3. There are no significant 
differences in the estimated parameters. 
Remarkably, we found that firms who give high priority to cost cutting projects do not seem to 
have invested more in energy conservation technologies than other firms. In contrast, firms that 
have other reasons, such as product innovation or increasing product flexibility (called expansion 
motives as opposed to cost cutting), have invested more in energy conservation technologies. This 
result is counter intuitive, because energy conservation technologies are often initiated for cost 
cutting operations. Moreover, this counter intuitive finding is not a case on its own. Strangely 
enough, firms that mention reducing energy costs as one of the reasons for investing in new 
technologies seem to have a lower degree of implementation than other firms. One possible 
explanation might be that firms who are focussed on cost cutting are less open minded about 
innovations than firms who try to seek new market possibilities. Cost cutting is a defensive attitude 
(and sometimes conservative), whereas seeking new opportunities is thinking positive. Cost cutting 
is often not the real solution to the problem.4 
The last variable that we consider here is the possibility of premature depreciation. Firms were 
asked whether it was possible to replace old equipment by new equipment before the old was fully 
depreciated. If this is possible, the autonomous replacement of technologies will be increased. 
History tells us that all new vintages of machineries are more energy efficiënt than its predecessor. 
Therefore we assume that when premature depreciation is possible, the degree of implementation 
will be higher. The possibility of premature depreciation is measured by 3 dummy variables, 
indicating whether it is possible, sometimes possible or totally impossible to have old equipment 
replaces before it is fully depreciated. The results from the survey show that firms who allow 
premature depreciation actually have implemented more energy conservation technologies. In other 
2
 Again, difficulties in interpretation can exist, because large firms often have a complex 
organisational structure. Thus the contribution of the positive effects on implementation of size and 
organisational complexity are somewhat intertwined. 
3
 The position of the energy manager depends on the organizational structure of the firm. That 
is why the relative position of the energy manager is measured. 
4
 In soccer there is a saying: "the best defense is offense". 
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words, refusing to replace an old vintage by a newer vintage can be a barder for the adoption of 
energy conservation technologies. 
4.5 Conclusions 
At the end of this section we would like to summarize the results which were listed above. Table 6 
presents the main conclusions from the analysis of influential factors, given the choice of the 
dependent variable. The variables have been ranked according to the importance of the influence on 
the dependent variable.5 Variables that have a distinct influence are in the first column, whereas 
variables that have no empirically relevant influence on the investment decision are in the last 
column. 
Most important variables Moderately important variables Unimportant variables 
1. ln(size) 1. market expectations 1. hurdle rate 
2. financing by bank 2. financing by subsidies 2. lower hurdle rate for energy 
3. financing with own money 3. number of information sources conservation investments 
4. possibüity to include cost 4. expansion as reason for 3. market share/market leader 
increases in sales price innovation 4. energy bill 
5. budgetary problems 5. dummy for expected increasing 5. energy coördinator 
6. spread between maximum and energy prices 1994 6. R&D department 
minimum energy pnces 6. minimum energy prices 2000 7. position energy manager 
7. organizational complexity 8. prioriry to cost cutting 
8. premature depreciation 9. maximum energy prices 
Table 6: Ranking of variables ac< :ording to their empirical degree i af influence 
We fïnd that some key theoretical variables, such as the energy bill and the hurdle rate, are not 
among the most important variables. Instead we fmd firm specifïc economie and organizational 
variables, such as size, the organizational complexity, premature depreciation and budgetary 
constraints as the most important determinants of energy conservation investment behaviour or 
barriers. Even among the group of moderately important variables energy related variables seem to 
be scarcely represented. This all leads to the conclusion that energy conservation investments are 
judged as "normal" investment projects, and that energy conservation investments face the same 
"barriers" as "normal" investments: where does the money come from to finance investments, how 
is the firm organized, is the old equipment fully depreciated? As expected the energy price does 
play a (small) role in the decision process, because it in fact determines profitability. However, the 
risk-aspect of the investment decision (the spread between maximum and minimum expected energy 
prices) is even more important. 
5. Analysis of potential barriers 
Above we analyzed the relations between the observed investment behavior (expressed as the ratio 
of aggregated prqfitable implementation over aggregated knowledge) and firm specifïc 
characteristics. However, these variables are some sort of ex post explanatory variables, that were 
assumed to have an effect on the investment decision. Below, we list the variables that play an 
important role in the (future) decision process for an energy conservation investment. In the first 
part we analyze which variables are considered important and we present a clustering of variables 
according to the empirical importance. In section 5.2 the results of the correspondence analysis are 
Note that they are not ranked according to "sign" or determinant/banier. 
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presented. 
5.1 Empirical importance of potential barriers 
For each of the variables the respondents were asked to state the importance of the variable for the 
initiation of an energy efficiency technology. It was measured on a ordered ratio scale with the 
following interpretation: 
0.9 = very important; 0.8 = important; 0.5 = neither important, not unimportant; 0.2 = unimportant; 
0.1 = totally unimportant. 
The averages importance of each variable over the total sample was taken, together with the 
correlation with degree of implementation and size. By aggregating over sectors the different 
accents of important variables are evened out. Therefore for each variable the sectors which attach a 
higher and lower degree of importance are also listed. The results are presented in table 7. 
Variable average 
importance 
correlation 
with 
investment 
correlation 
with size 
higher than 
average 
importance 
lower than 
average 
importance 
contribution to profit 0.70 -0.04 -0.165 meat, agricul. health&educ. 
return on investment 0.73 0.28 0.05 bulk, metal other chem, 
health&educ. 
distance to core business 0.45 0.17 0.04 meat health&educ, 
metal 
size of energy bill 0.63 0.08 -0.16 meat, agricul building, bulk 
uncertainty new tech-
nologies 
0.47 0.11 0.07 food, bank 
and insurance 
health&educ, 
metal 
ówn financial sources 0.65 -0.05 -0.14 agriculture, 
health&educ 
banks, other 
industries 
external financial sources 0.51 0.03 -0.12 health&educ, 
agriculture 
food, other 
chemicals 
uncertainty future e-prices 0.50 -0.01 -0.02 food, retail, 
agriculture 
bulk, other 
chemicals 
low expected energy 
prices 
0.45 -0.03 -0.07 agriculture meat, bulk, 
building 
intemal rules 0.37 0.09 -0.03 health&educ, 
oth.chemicals 
metal, bulk 
external rules 0.46 0.14 -0.03 food, other 
chemicals 
meat, bulk, 
metal 
intemal opposition 0.35 -0.01 0.06 health&educ. building 
market expectations 0.54 -0.1 -0.03 meat, agricul-
ture, metal 
health&educ. 
bank, retail 
degree of competition 0.50 -0.01 -0.09 other chemi-
cals, meat 
health&educ, 
banks 
required additional 
investment costs 
0.65 0.04 -0.00 meat, agricul-
ture, retail 
health&educ, 
banks, bulk 
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additional effort for 
implementation 
0.48 0.08 -0.05 meat, banks, 
retail 
metal, other 
chemicals 
additional costs of 
information collection 
0.45 0.06 -0.07 other chemi-
cals, bank 
building, 
food 
qualified personnel 0.49 -0.04 -0.03 meat, bulk retail, metal 
high standards of 
production quality 
0.67 0.02 -0.07 meat, bulk, 
agriculture 
health&educ. 
banks, metal 
high standards of 
production flexibility 
0.59 0.00 -0.04 meat, 
building 
health&educ. 
banks, retail 
high standards of working 
conditions 
0.68 0.04 -0.03 meat, food, 
bulk 
metal, banks, 
retail 
old equipment not fully 
depreciated 
0.61 -0.01 -0.1 retail, 
agriculture 
meat, bulk 
environmental image 0.63 0.05 -0.00 other chem. metal 
Table 7: Results of empirical importance of potential barriers. 
From table 7 the most important variables can be derived. Given the coding scheme, variables that 
have an average importance of more than 0.6 are considered to be very important, an importance 
between 0.5 and 0.6 is considered moderately important. Variables with an average importance of 
less than 0.5 are considered not to be important. Hence, we can make a distinction in three groups. 
They are ranked and presented in table 8. 
Most important variables Moderately important variables Unimportant variables 
1. Return on investment 1. Securing production 1. Internal opposition 
2. Contribution to total profit flexibility 2. Internal rules 
3. Securing working conditions 2. Market expectations 3. External rules 
4. Securing production quality 3. Extemal financial sources 4. Low energy prices 
5. Availability of own financial 4. Uncertainty energy prices 5. Distance to core business 
sources 5. Degree of competence 6. Costs collection addit info 
6. Additional required investment 7. Additional time and effort 
costs 8. Uncertainty new 
7. Size of energy bill technologies 
8. Environmental image 9. Qualified personnel 
9. Depreciation status of old 
equipment 
Table 8: List of ranked importance of variables. 
Among the most important variables is only one variable directly related to energy conservation 
(size of energy bill) and one related to the environment. The previous analysis showed that energy 
bill was not very important. From these results we conclude that energy conservation investments 
are judged as any other investment: mainly on an economie cost/benefit analysis. Even variables as 
uncertainty about energy prices and low expected energy prices play a modest role in the 
investment decision. In a way this seems inconsistent with the fact that they find return on 
investment very important, because the return of a stand alone technology is largely determined by 
the energy prices. On the other hand, it might be in line with the belief that revenues from energy 
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conservation technologies are not only on energy conservation but also in other areas, such as 
production flexibility and labour flexibility. 
From the column with correlations we can also see that firms who find return on investment very 
important also implement more energy conservation technologies. This could be evidence of the fact 
that there are many cost-effective energy conservation opportunities, and firms who make an 
extensive analysis of costs and benefits will indeed find that there are many cost-effective 
opportunities. 
Another remarkable result is that firms do not seem to be bothered by the fact that energy 
conservation is not directly related to their "core business" activities. That is found not to be 
relevant. Moreover, firms who do find core business activities important seem to consider energy 
conservation as one of their core business activities, because there seems to be a positive correlation 
between implementation and importance of core business activities. This could be empirical 
evidence for the hypothesis that the importance of energy conservation is widely and well spread. 
There is no empirical evidence that the concern for product quality, production flexibility and 
working conditions is hampering the implementation of energy efficiënt technologies, because the 
correlations are all very close to zero. These concerns tend to be less for bigger firms, as is also the 
contribution of an investment to total profït. 
The availability of own fïnancial resources is negatively correlated with the degree of 
implementation. This could imply that firms that find this issue important are having some trouble 
finding a way of financing the technological investments. The importance of this issue decreases 
with size of a firm. Bigger firm find own fïnancial resources less important. Perhaps it is easier for 
them to get their money elsewhere. 
The relation between premature depreciation and implementation is negative as expected, but very 
small. The correlation between the importance of Ml depreciation and size, however, is strongly 
negative. It means that bigger firms seem to be replacing old equipment sooner than small firms, 
hence implementing more energy conservation equipment. The effects of environmental image are 
positive but very small. The relation between environmental image and size is negligible. 
5.2 Correspondence analysis 
In the previous section a clustering was made into three groups of variables, according to their 
empirically proven importance. Here we would like to present the results from the correspondence 
analysis where we tried to match the observed variables tot the potential barriers. As stated before, 
the theoretical correspondence is not 100% clear in all cases, but it is tried to make the 
correspondence as close as possible. Table 9 lists the qualitative results from correlation analysis. 
The expectation is that all correlations are positive. 
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Possible banier Observed equivalent Correspondence' 
1. Contribution to total profits 1. N.A. 1. N.A. 
2. Return on investment 2. Energy conservation hurdle rate 2. reasonable 
3. Distance to core business 3. Lower hurdle rates for energy 
conservation/ energy conservation as 
reason for innovation 
3. reasonable 
4. Size of energy bill 4. gas/electricity bill 4. bad 
5. Uncertainty new technologies 5. number of information sources 
/development new technologies 
5. Cl 
6. Own financial sources 6. reserves 6. Cl 
7. Extemal financial sources 7. bank 7.extreme good 
8. Uncertainty about energy prices 8. spread between maximum and 
minimum expected energy prices 
8. bad 
9. Low expected energy prices 9. minimum expected energy prices 9. reasonable 
10. Internal rules 10. type of organizational 10. good 
11. External rules complexity 11. good/ 
11. sectoral long term reasonable 
12. Internal opposition agreement/external pressure 12. good 
13. Market expectations 12. size/type of organization 13. bad 
14. Degree of competition 13. market expectations index 
14. calculation cost increase in sales 
14. good 
15. Required additional investment costs price 15. good 
16. Additional effort of implementation 15. budgetary problems 
16. Average effort from ICARUS 
16. bad 
17. Additional effort of information collection 17. Cl / 
17. number of information reasonable 
18. Qualified personnel sources/energy coördinator 18. Cl 
18. Type of organizational /bad 
complexity / external energy 19. good 
19. High standards of production quality coördinator 20. extremely 
19. product innovation as reason for good 
20. High standards of production flexibility technological innovation 
20. production flexibility as reason 21. good 
21. High standards of working conditions for innovation 
21. increase labour productivity/ 22. good 
22. Old equipment not fully depreciated reduction labour costs 23. very good 
23. Environmental image 22. premature depreciation allowance 
23. environmental care system/ 
internal energy coördinator 
Classification of correspondence: 
extreme good: p > 0.3; very good: 0.2 < p < 0.3; good: 0.1 < p < 0.2; reasonable: 0.05 < p < 0.1; bad: p < 
0.05; counter intuitive (Cl): p < 0; N.A: not available. 
Table 9: Results from correspondence test 
The correspondence of most variables is adequate, which is an ensuring thought. Nevertheless, there 
are some strange empirical results. For instance the low correspondence between actual size of 
energy bill and stated importance of energy bill in investment decisions. One explanation might be 
that the size of the energy bill plays an important role in energy conservation decision regardless of 
its size: if a firm has a large energy bill then the size is important because potential gains are high 
and the energy bill influences the investment decision positively; if the energy bill is small then it 
the investment decision becomes more delicate and the size of the energy bill can be the difference 
between implementing and not. Anyhow, the size of the energy bill plays an important role, leading 
to a low correlation. 
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There are also some counter intuitive relations. For instance, the number of information sources is 
positively correlated with the uncertainty of new technologies. One would expect that being 
strongly informed about energy conservation technologies would decrease the uncertainty of new 
technologies. We do not have an explanation for this result. Another remarkable correlation is the 
one between own financial sources and fïnancing investments with own money. One would expect 
that when reserves are the main source of funding investments, the presence of own money to fund 
investment would play an important role in the investment decision. However, the empirical 
correlation shows that the importance of having own financial sources decreases with reserves being 
the main source of finance. One could conclude that firms who finance investments with their own 
money do not seem to bother about the presence of own financial sources. This idea seems to be 
supported by the fact that having own money is especially important to firms who lend money at 
the bank. Apparently, they would rather finance the investment with own means. Again, a bank as 
intermediary is not judged in a positive way. 
Surprisingly, the correspondence between expected fluctuations and stated influence of fluctuations 
on investment decision is quite low. Firms who say that fluctuations are important when making an 
investment decision do not have higher expected fluctuations in energy prices. Consequently, we 
tend to conclude that high expected fluctuations can be a banier in general, but as the expected 
fluctuations are quite small, they do not seem to play an important banier in this survey. 
5.3 Conclusions 
Again, among the list of potentially most important barriers there are many variables that relate to 
"normal" business activities and not specially tot energy conservation. Product quality, working 
conditions and profitability of the invesment are among the most important factors that seem to 
influence the investment decision. Also the availability of financial sources and allowance for 
premature depreciation are very important. Low expected energy prices do not seem to play an 
important role. These results are less dependent on the definition of investment behaviour, and 
therefore more robust. 
6. Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
We have presented an empirical analysis of the potentially influential factors and barriers. Our 
analysis was a first attempt to find relations between investment behaviour and potential 
determinants of investment behaviour. Investment behavior was defined as the degree of profitable 
energy conservation implementations given a knowledge base. We tried to explain investment 
behaviour in two ways: first by conelation the degree of implementation and the observed firm 
specific variables, and secondly, by analysing the importance of potential barriers. We also tried to 
find an adequate conespondence between the observed variables and the stated importance of 
potential barriers. 
Comparing tables 6 and 8 there are two important conclusions that can be drawn. The first and 
main conclusion is that energy conservation investments are no special investment cases, at least not 
when firms are only dealing with known energy technologies. The most important determinants of 
energy conservation investment behaviour do not seem to be specific to energy conservation: return 
on investment, budgetary constraints, premature depreciation, orginazational complexity are all "non 
energy specific" determinants. We tend to conclude that even though environmental image is one of 
the main determinants, investments are made on a cost/benefit analysis, just as every other 
invesment decision. 
This conclusion is immediately foliowed by the second, and less positive conclusion: the major 
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variables that determine the return on investment and risk of an energy conservation investment 
project are not among the most important determinants. This is not what we had expected. 
Minimum expected energy prices and low expected energy prices do not seem to play a prime role 
in the investment decision. The size of the energy bill looks like a non-relevant variable, and also 
other variables, such as energy coördinator and R&D department do not seem to contribute much to 
the energy conservation investment decision. Moreover, table 1 shows that the percentage of non-
profitable energy conservation investments is not negligable, which needs us to put our first 
conclusion in perspective. 
The theoretical arguments behind the potential determinants and barriers are nevertheless quite 
strong, and the contrast between theory and our empirical analysis is quite large. In other words, 
there has to be some explanation for the discrepancies between our findings and the theory. There 
are some possible answers. One is that the information in ICARUS is not in line with the 
information that firms have about implementation and profitability of energy conservation 
technologies. Firms are likely to make different assessments about returns and risks. Moreover, the 
information in ICARUS is a sectoral level, whereas our survey is on the firm level. The difference 
in focus of analysis can lead to substantial differences (especially regarding individual costs of 
initiating or replacement). Further research is needed to increase the interactions between ICARUS 
and our survey. 
A second explanation for the differences in findings is that the answers in our survey are less 
consistent than we would have liked. Some of the questions appeared to be too difficult to answer. 
Some respondents made a "lucky guess". Many questions are on a qualitative scale which always 
introduces more inaccuracy than continuous variables. Dealing with these qualitative variables as if 
they were quantitative can lead to problems of interpretation. 
Of course, the biggest inaccuracies are made when one tries to capture "investment behaviour of 
firms" in one single number or variable. The conclusions of our analysis thus depend heavily on our 
defmition of investment behaviour. Other definitions might lead to other results. Sensitivity analysis 
is one topic of further research. However, we tend to conclude that within our definition of 
investment behaviour a "normal" micro economie cost benifit approach is in order. 
The conclusions that we have drawn might have some reprecussions on governmental policy. 
Instead of labelling energy conservation as part of a national environmental strategy, energy 
conservation policy should direct itself on economie instruments, and less on bilateral negotiations 
and agreements, for which the monitoring system is very costly and unreliable. Economie 
instruments, such as energy taxes will place more incentive and could push the energy price over a 
certain point were prices does become important. Another line of attention is to somehow make it 
easier for firms to get the money for the investments. However, one should be cautious with 
subsidies or other financial incentives because the free rider problem still exists. A good way of 
monitoring has not yet been found. 
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Appendix A: Coding scheme for Dutch sectors 
Ducth (Sub)Sector Merging Sec 
sectoral code 
2021 diary 1 
2051 sugar 1 
2061 oils, fats 1 
2129 fodder 1 
2011 public slaughter houses 2 
2012 wage slaughter houses 2 
2013 other slaughter houses 2 
2014 meat 2 
2113 fodder 1 
2151 breweries 1 
2152 malthouses 1 
22xx textiles 3 
25xx furnitures 3 
26xx paper (bulk) 5 
27xx graphical 3 
2811 refineries 4 
2821 cokes 4 
2911 fertilizers 4 
28xx petrochemical 4 
2942 anorganic chemicals 4 
2961 medicines 5 
2991 glue 5 
2921 other chemicals 5 
2971 soap 5 
3211+3212 brickes and tiles 6 
3224 potteries 6 
3251 cement 6 
3281+3282+3283+3284 glas 6 
32xx other building materials 6 
33xx iron and steel 7 
3341+3342+3343+3344+3402 no ferro 7 
34xx other metal 7 
81xx banks 8 
82xx insurance 8 
83xx office buildings 9 
67xx catering 9 
65xx, 66xx retail 9 
0111 agriculture 10 
121/127 horticulture 10 
miscel. health 11 
miscel. education 11 
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Appendix B: Description of Database 
Variables that should/could explain imestment behaviour 
Here, we list the most important variables from which we have individual data. 
Variable Unit of measurement 
size (annual tumover) in millions of Dfl 
sector code dummy variables for 11 sectors 
electricity^bill in thousands of Dfl 
gas-bill in thousands of Dfl 
total energy bill (also oil if present) in thousands of Dfl 
energy intensity estimated percentage of energy costs in total production costs 
function of respondent financial/general/technical/energy/investment management 
main criterion for investments PBP/NPV/IRR/simple CB/non-economic 
minimum return on investment PBP cut-off point (in years) 
subjective idea of exploited potential enough/adequate/less than adequate/no more possibilities 
subjective idea of exploited good 
housekeeping 
enough/adequate/less than adequate 
reasons for investing in technological 
innovation 
increase tumover/ energy savings /labour savings /capital 
savings/increase productivity/ increase flexibility 
reasons for investing in energy 
conserv. innovation 
increase tumover/ energy savings /labour savings /capital 
savings/increase productivity/ increase flexibility 
information sources number of used information sources {1,..,12} 
minimum expected energy price 
1994 and 2000 
index (1993=100) 
maximum expected energy price 
1994 and 2000 
index (1993=100) 
additional energy efficiency due to 
temporal 50% resp. 100% increase e-
prices 
percentage of total energy bill to be reduced due to higher energy 
prices 
additional energy efficiency due to 
structural 50% resp. 100% increase 
e-prices 
percentage of total energy bill to be reduced 
possibility of increasing sales price totally possible/ partially possible/ impossible 
ways of fmancing investments bank/ capital market/ issuing stock/ savings/ subsidies/ special 
budget 
budget problems (cancellation of 
project due to liquidity constraint) 
l=yes; 2=no 
premature depreciation yes/no 
relative energy efficiency more/equal/less than average in sector 
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R & D department yes/no 
energy coördinator internal/external/non/both 
sectoral long term agreement number of years (0=no agreement) 
frequency energy check number of times per year (0,1,2,4,6,12,52,300) 
decisive power energy conservation 
investments 
fmancial/ general/ technical/ energy/investment management 
environmental care system yes/no 
extemal pressure yes/no 
effects market expectations on EC-
investments 
positive/negative 
type of organisation simple/normal/advanced 
effects strong competition on EC-
investments 
positive/negative 
Potential barriers 
Here we list a number of variables that firms might experience as being an obstacle for implementation of 
energy conservation options. For each of the following items this question was asked: 
When initiating an energy conservation investment, how important is the following item with regards to 
the actual decision? 
(0.1=totally not important; 0.2=not important; 0.5=average importance; 0.8=important; 0.9=very important) 
The following items were presented: 
a. contribution of investment to total profits 
b. return on investment 
c. extent to which an investment belongs to core business activities 
d. size of energy bill at the moment 
e. uncertainty regarding new. unfamiliar technologies 
f. capacity of own fmancial resources 
g. possibility of extemal fmancial resources 
h. uncertainty regarding future energy prices 
i. low expected energy prices 
j . internal rules 
k. extemal mies 
1. internal opposition 
m. market expectations 
n. degree of competition 
o. additional investment costs 
p. additional effort 
q. additional time and costs to get new information 
r. educated personnel 
s. keeping product quality 
t. keeping production fiexibility 
u. keeping good labour environment 
v. present techniques have not been fiilly depreciated 
w. environmental image 
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